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I. INTRODUCTION
Information is a key resource in any organization. The
Naval Reserve is no exception. But is it treated as a key
resource? How is it managed? Clearly, the management of
information within the Naval Reserve is dependent upon the
larger issues of strategic policy and organizational
philosophy regarding information systems management. It is
not a question of whether the Naval Reserve should plan the
evolution of their information architecture, because some
kind of planning is taking place, mandated at least by the
budgeting process. The question is how well articulated is
that planning process and what is the methodology behind it?
IBM's Business Systems Planning (BSP) is one such
methodology. Would it be an appropriate information systems
planning guide for the Naval Reserve? The purpose of this
thesis is to evaluate BSP as a methodology for analyzing the
Naval Reserve in order to determine information systems (IS)
needs.
This thesis is limited to an evaluation of BSP as a
methodology for understanding information flow in the Naval
Reserve in order to enable information resource decisions to
be made in a coherent and consistent manner. To adequately
evaluate this methodology it is necessary to examine the
entire Naval Reserve structure. This organization will be
examined by itself and as a part of the larger Navy-
organization.
This thesis attempts to answer the following questions:
1) What is the structure of the Naval Reserve and what is
the information flow that supports that structure?
2) What are the current information systems supporting
the Naval Reserve and how effective are they?
3) Does the Naval Reserve have a long-range IS strategy,
and if so, what is the methodology behind it?
4) Is BSP a feasible approach for IS planning in the
Naval Reserve?
Chapter II examines the structure of the Naval Reserve
organization. The context of that examination is in the
supporting information flows, both internal and external.
The information systems of the organization are also
evaluated in this chapter. The purpose of Chapter II is to
familiarize the reader with the organization and its func-
tions in a general way and to gain an appreciation for some
of the complexities facing the IS planner.
Chapter III looks at some of the issues involved in
strategic IS planning. BSP is introduced here in relation
to other planning methodologies. Finally, this chapter
examines the IS planning process of the Naval Reserve.
Chapter IV examines the BSP methodology in more detail.
This is done in the context of the Naval Reserve. A partial
analysis of the organization is undertaken utilizing the BSP
methodology.
Chapter V presents the final conclusions of the
evaluation process.
II. A DESCRIPTION OF THE NAVAL RESERVE ORGANIZATION
A. INTRODUCTION
There are two main objectives for this chapter:
1) To describe the organizational structure of the Naval
Reserve and the interfaces it has with other commands.
The focus of this discussion will be on the internal
and external information flows.
2) To present a description of the automated information
systems in place within the organization and an
evaluation of the extent to which they appear to
satisfy the functional needs of the organization.
The structural relationships are represented by five
diagrams (Figures 2-1 through 2-5) . Figure 2-1 shows the
internal hierarchical structure of the Naval Reserve.
Figures 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4 are the organization diagrams for
the staffs of Commander Naval Reserve Force (CNRF)
,
Commander Naval Air Reserve Force (CNARF) , and Commander
Naval Surface Reserve Force (CNSRF) respectively. Although
they may be great fun to look at, the utility of organiza-
tional charts in describing what is happening within an
organization and the relative power of each box is dubious
at best. They do little to describe the political reality
of the organization. The most important part of any organi-
zation is what happens between the blocks, the mechanisms
for communication and conflict resolution. This same caveat
applies- to the fifth diagram (Figure 2-5) . It depicts the
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Figure 2-5 Naval Reserve External Information Flows
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commands. It is not as clean as the other diagrams because
there exist external interfaces at various internal organi-
zational levels.
The following discussion will focus primarily on the
information flows represented by the arrows in Figures 2-1
and 2-5. As can be readily seen, to describe the Naval
Reserve organization and its supporting information flows,
even in a general way, is no simple task, due principally to
the complexity of the external interfaces. This discussion
will concentrate on the manpower, personnel, and training
functions of the Naval Reserve. The areas of logistics and
facilities management will not be examined. This is not
because they are not important, but to keep the analysis
from becoming too burdensome; and because they can be broken
out fairly cleanly, that is, their processes and information
flows are separate and distinct from the areas under
consideration here.
B. THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The mission of the Commander of the Naval Reserve is the
training and administration of all Naval Reserve forces.
The Naval Reserve Command manages and administers over
120,000 personnel; 3000 drilling units at over 300 drill
sites; assets in excess of four billion dollars; and annual
expenditures in excess of 900 million dollars. With
resources such as these, it is imperative that information
concerning personnel, money, equipment, and most
16
importantly, the relationship of these factors to overall
readiness be accurate and readily available. The overall
goal of automated information systems within the Naval
Reserve should be to support efficient and effective
resource management, track training and personnel mobiliza-
tion readiness, and provide an efficacious mechanism for the
support of mobilization. The rest of this chapter will
explore the functions of the different command levels, the
scope and source of the information necessary to effectively
perform those functions, and the role of existing automated
information systems in support of that performance.
The concentration here will be on those functions which
are essential for accomplishing the mission area objectives
of the Naval Reserve. Although none of these functions is
wholly confined to any one level of the organizational
hierarchy, the degree and requisite information at each com-
mand level should be different for each function. The major
manpower, personnel, and training (MPT) functions of the
Naval Reserve are: 1) reserve pay and personnel; 2) man-
power management; 3) mobilization; 4) training; and 5)
recruiting. '
•'-As will be discussed in the next chapter, OP-094 is
responsible for developing the Navy's high level information
architecture; and the Director, Total Force Information Sys-
tems Management Division (OP-16) is responsible for develop-
ing the information architecture for MPT functions. All of
the functional sub-areas identified by OP-16 are not pre-
sented here. The additional five functional areas were
intentionally omitted because they are felt to apply only
peripherally or as part of a broader functional area. The
17
A decomposition of functional processes and their
related input/output data reveals seven major categories of
information required to support the MPT functional
processes. These categories of information, their defini-
tions, as well as a discussion of the source and extent (at
what command levels the information is needed) of that
information follow:
a) MANPOWER—Information related to billet/position re--
quirements (quality and quantity) , billet authoriza-
tions, and strength. The source of this information
is outside the Naval Reserve organization at the OPNAV
level. The preponderance of this information is
needed at the upper command levels for planning and
program management. The individual unit CO. has need
for this information only as it applies to his unit.
b) PERSONNEL—Personal information needed to train, mobi-
lize, promote, assign, retain/separate individuals.
This information originates at the Reserve unit level.
The need for this data in anything other than summary
format above the echelon 4 level is questionable.
c) PAY—Information relating to the expenditure of funds
from the RPN appropriation. The source of the expen-
diture data is the Naval Finance Center (NAVFINCEN)
and it is used in varying degrees by all command
levels. The individual reservist is concerned with
his paycheck, the comptrollers their budget, and the
Personnel Support Detachments (PSD) their disburse-
ments. The source of the data from which the expendi-
tures are derived is at the echelon 5 level, the unit
and Reserve Center. Any area where real money is
involved is a sensitive one. The accountability
measures and potential for fraud have thus far pre-
cluded this process (at the unit level) from
automation.
d) TRAINING--Information needed to plan and manage train-
ing, including evaluation of selected reserve (SELRES)
readiness. This information originates at both ends
of the spectrum. The requirements are defined at the
program sponsor (OPNAV) level and refined at the
interested reader can refer to Reference 1.
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echelon 2, 3, and 4 levels. Readiness is evaluated at
the unit level and flows in a condensed and summarized
format back up the chain and to gaining commands out-
side of the Naval Reserve organization.
e) MOBILIZATION—Recall and status information required
to mobilize the total force. Again this is informa-
tion that originates at both ends of the spectrum.
The critical issue here is not so much the infonnation
but the communication of that information. Present
mobilization procedures utilize a poor mix of old and
new technologies.
f) POLICY—Higher level guidance which ensures business
is conducted in a consistent manner. Military policy
usually is dictated from above and flows downhill, but
information from which those policies are derived
comes from many different sources.
g) PPBS—Information relating to POM and budgeting proc-
ess. Ideally this information originates at the low-
est command levels and moves upward in a summary
format. Generally the level of detail is greater at
the lower levels for any individual line item while
the breadth of information is greater at higher
command levels.
The idea of the varying extent of each of these
categories at different command levels is presented
graphically in Figure 2-6.
No analysis of the internal organizational structure is
complete without an obligatory reference to the staff wiring
diagrams (Figs. 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4). As was mentioned at the
beginning of this chapter, the diagrams are of limited value
because they often do not accurately describe the organiza-
tion. Nevertheless they do draw attention to a few inter-
esting relationships. One is what they say about the
relative importance of the MIS function within the organiza-
tion. There is no formally identified focal point on the
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the CNRF staff is low in the hierarchy and separate from
other functional areas. It is, however, formally in the
planning department and supposedly responsible for ADP
planning. Although these are officially three separate
staffs, they are physically located in the same building.
They are not as separate and distinct as the organization
charts would seem to suggest. The senior flag. Air or
Surface, also serves as Commander Naval Reserve Force.
-
These are important distinctions to remember when looking at
how information systems planning is being done and who is
doing it.
C. EXTERNAL INFORMATION INTERFACES
One useful way of looking at the information require-
ments of the Naval Reserve is to view that information as a
total force requirement in relation to the individual reser-
vist. That individual reservist can then be perceived as
both the raw material and the finished product of the Naval
Reserve subsystem.
The functions of the users of the different categories
of MPT information can be placed in one of three broad
classes: planning, control, or execution. These are analo-
gous to the functions of top (strategic)
,
middle, and line
(operations) management in the business environment. The
characteristics of the requisite information resources is
different for each of these processes. Information required
for operational control functions will generally need to be
21
more accurate, structured, detailed, and timely than
information used for strategic planning purposes. The Naval
Reserve and the interfacing external commands can therefore
be looked at as being concerned with the individual reser-
vist in either a strategic planning role, program control
role, or program execution role.
The primary organizations that are responsible under the
total force management concept, for the participating reser-
vist are: for planning--OP-01 and OP-09R; for control—CNRF
(echelons 2 through 4) , Naval Military Personnel Command
(NMPC) , Naval Reserve Personnel Command (NRPC) , and
NAVFINCEN; for execution—CNRF (all echelons) and PSDs.
This is by no means a complete list. Other interfacing
organizational entities include: Congress, Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) , Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
,
resource sponsors. Navy Comptroller (NAVCOMPT) , Chief of
Naval Education and Training (CNET) , Commander Navy Recruit-
ing Command (CNRC) , and World-Wide Military Command and
Control System (WWMCCS)
.
The general way in which the sources or end users of
different categories of information are outside the scope of
the Naval Reserve organization has been described in the
previous section. The thrust of this section has been to
describe the information related interfaces between the
Naval Reserve and external organizations in a less parochial
more gestalt manner. This discussion has focused on the
22
relationships depicted in Figure 2-5. The matrix below
relates the different types of information to some of the
external commands by showing what categories of information
go beyond the Naval Reserve organization and the other com-




OPNAV NMPC NRPC NAV-
FINCEN
CNRC CNET HHHCCS PSA/
PSD
HANPOUER X
PERSONNEL X X X X X
PAY X X X X X
TRAINING X X X X X X
HOB X X X X X
POLICY X X
PPBS X X X X
The purpose of examining the nature and extent of the
external information interfaces is to recognize the impact
of this complex network of data interdependencies on infor-
mation systems planning. Much of the data are owned and/or
defined by these external organizations. Although these
definitions should be consistent across different commands,
it is too often the case that they are not. The problem of
data administration is central to the development of any
coherent information architecture in the MPT arena. Unfor-
tunately this cannot be addressed in much more than a
23
reactionary mode at the CNRF level for data externally
defined.
D. CURRENT NAVAL RESERVE AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEMS
This section will describe the automated information
systems being used within the Naval Reserve organization to
support those functions outlined in the previous sections.
An attempt will also be made to evaluate the effectiveness
of those systems. The efficiency of those systems will not
be considered unless it was designated a pivotal critical
success factor in the design of the system; or if an effec-
tive system is plainly inefficient. The reason for this
focus of evaluation is that it is very easy to get
sidetracked in efficiency issues while losing sight of the
big picture. You may be spending all your time evaluating
the speed and proficiency of the ambulance crews in the
valley when you should be asking why there is no fence on
the cliff.
There are at least two levels of analysis of the effec-
tiveness of an AIS. The obvious evaluation is to determine
if it is accomplishing the function (s) for which it was
designed. The second, sometimes less perceptible, concern
deals with the legitimacy of the design. It is examining
the utility of the function in light of the organization's
missions. Should the function be performed? If so, should
it be automated?
24
1. The Reserve Training Support System (RTSS)
The Reserve Training Support System (RTSS) is an
outgrowth of, and essentially the same as, the active duty
system known as the Aviation Training Support System (ATSS)
.
The ATSS concept was designed in 1971 as a training support
system oriented toward enlisted aircraft maintenance train-
ing, and was developed out of a need for relief in assigning
courses and tracking students.- Its early success led to-
duplication and adaptation by other communities. The Naval
Air community currently uses ATSS. The Submarine community
uses VTS . The Reserve community named their adaptation
RTSS. These systems all have the same basic configuration.
The original procurement of the DEC PDF 11/4 com-
puter as the initial hardware for the ATSS system in 1971
was exempted from the lengthy and complex Automatic Data
Processing Equipment (ADPE) approval requirements by the
Chief of Naval Material because it was designated solely a
training device. In order to keep the designation as a
training device certain design alternatives, such as
expanding the system to include requirements for other
related information systems, had to be traded-off as the
system evolved. The decisions not to expand ATSS were based
on the perceived need to maintain exemption status under the
ADPE acquisition regulations. This is an important implica-
tion in the development of RTSS inasmuch as it was fashioned
after the model of ATSS.
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The Chief of Naval Reserve became interested in ATSS
as a viable training and administration tool in 1977. ATSS
was chosen as the most cost-effective method to achieve its
required personnel training and training management support.
One justification was that savings would be realized by
adopting an existing system and avoiding the time-consuming
and expensive systems development process. Many of the
shortcomings of the present system can be traced back to
this basic fallacious assumption. For funding and control
purposes the system was renamed the Reserve Training Support
System (RTSS) . It consisted of three major component
systems: RTSS(TM) for training management, RTSS (Surface)
for surface/ashore, and the RTSS (Air) for aviation. This
analysis will focus primarily on the Training Management
(TM) and Surface components of RTSS. CNAVRESINST 5230 [Ref.
2:p. 2-1] established policy for the development as follows:
The Reserve Training Support System (RTSS) is an automated
training management support system. The purpose of the
system is to provide training management support to field
Naval Reserve training administrators and to increase the
quality of training readiness information reporting at all
Naval Reserve Command levels. A dual system approach will
provide for a field training system in support of Naval
Reserve field administrators and a Regional Training
Management System in support of staff functions.
Another subsystem (RESULTS) has recently been added
to support new recruit tracking. The RTSS(TM) is the pri-
mary component of the three and the objectives of the other
components are mostly subsets and elaborations of its objec-
tives. The RTSS(TM) was designed to support training
26
management, mobilization assignment, readiness measurement,
and mobilization and readiness reporting. The long-term
objectives of the system are [Ref. 3: pp. 2-2,2-3]:
a) Increasing the quantity and quality of Selected
Reserve mobilization billet assignment capability at
all command levels.
b) Integrating personnel and training record data under a
single system accessible from remote locations.
c) Providing a methodology for the real-time measurement
and reporting of personnel- training readiness.
d) Increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of
scheduling training for the drilling Reservist.
e) Providing more timely and accurate information for
mobilization reporting.
f) Improving the reliability of training information at
all command levels.
g) Reducing the administrative and clerical workload of
operating units.
h) "Capturing" input data at the source, thereby elimi-
nating intermediate error-inducing steps.
i) Providing limited stand-alone local processing capabi-
lities for the Naval Reserve Center.
j) Providing an integrated communications capability
enabling the localized units to exchange/update data
with CNAVRES RTSS(TM) centralized data base and other
RTSS (Surface) units.
When the system was first conceived the long-term
goal was for the -three components to be fully integrated
into a consolidated and centralized database to provide
real-time information for personnel, mobilization, recruit-
ing, readiness, and training management. At present they
are still three separate systems in that there are separate
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duplicated files for each system. The Air and Surface files
are updated from the TM on a periodic basis.
All RTSS hardware is obsolete off-the-shelf equip-
ment owned and maintained by CNRF. The RTSS(TM) consists of
a PDP-11 series Central Processing Unit, associated periph-
erals, terminals, interface components, and communications
equipment. The PDP-11 is being upgraded to a DEC/VAX 780
this fiscal year which will require redesign of the operat--
ing system and database management system. Communication
between the central computer (New Orleans) and remote dumb
terminals (at 31 locations throughout the U.S.) is accom-
plished through asynchronous modems connected to a dedicated
line via local call access. Three nodes share one line.
The RTSS (Surface) hardware is essentially the same, there
is just more of it. Currently there are 17 PDP-11 series
minicomputers at 15 Regional Readiness Commands and two
Central Drill Sites (Central Drill Sites are essentially
just big Reserve Centers) . The goal is to have these minis
at 80 sites throughout the country. All Reserve Centers
either have or are getting microcomputers.
The RTSS central site software consists of the DEC
Resource Sharing Time Sharing/Extended (RSTS/E) operating
system, several Higher Order Languages, applications support
programs, and applications programs. Software is centrally,
designed, developed, and tested. Programming capabilities
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are not available except through the central RTSS site in
New Orleans.
The majority of the Data Processing personnel are in
New Orleans. Each Readiness Command (REDCOM) has one DP
trained civilian on its staff. Any additional DP skills at
command levels below New Orleans (Echelon 2) are of the
home-grown variety.
The principal component- of RTSS are central files
kept at New Orleans with remote terminals at each Readiness
Command and Naval Air Reserve sites for data entry and
limited file queries. The route which data follow into
those files is circuitous and confusing. The process begins
at the Reserve Unit level at each drill site (Reserve
Center) . Each drill weekend the unit must complete a per-
sonnel diary form and an RTSS input form to record any per-
sonnel related data changes (i.e., affiliations, NOBCs,
NECs, mobilization billet readiness). This information is
reviewed for accuracy by the Reserve Center staff and the
RTSS form is mailed to the cognizant regional Readiness
Command; the diary to the Naval Reserve Personnel Center New
Orleans. The data on the two forms should be identical.
The diary information is input to the Inactive Manpower And
Personnel Management Information System (IMAPMIS) database
by personnel in New Orleans. The RTSS information is
reviewed at the REDCOM and input to the RTSS files. Once a
month, tapes are swapped and the two files update each other
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(theoretically) , with IMAPMIS updating all the fields in
RTSS except for two, Individual Readiness Assignment Desig-
nator (IRAD) and Mobilization Assignment (MOBA) . The
IMAPMIS files are updated from RTSS for these two fields.
Although this crossover is supposed to be taking place
monthly, reports generated by the two systems infrequently
coincide. There are recognized problems in the IMAPMIS
system as well as the interface between the two, which are
being worked on.
In general, RTSS output is used as a cross-check on
IMAPMIS data, but the latter is given priority, not because
IMAPMIS produces more accurate or timely data, but because
it is the recognized, official source for management pur-
poses, including pay and retirement points. In fact, RTSS
is perceived as the more accurate source of information but
it is not used as the primary management tool because
IMAPMIS is the official source.
The current distribution of data processing within
the RTSS system, using Lorin • s [Ref. 4] model, finds the
system components slowly spreading outward, the DP skills
centralized, and the management centralized by design but
distributed through neglect. In the words of a special
panel which looked at the Information Systems requirements
of the Naval Reserve in 1984, "In effect, the distribution
of computing is beginning to occur without a plan, and with
great potential for duplication and ineffective effort."
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[Ref. 5: p. 5-2] There is no reason to assume that the
situation has improved in the two years since that study was
completed.
How well does the present system satisfy the design
objectives? It has not increased the quality of mobiliza-
tion billet assignment capability at all command levels, and
although the quantity of assignments has increased, that
growth cannot be attributed to RTSS. Since IMAPMIS is still
-
used as the official source of personnel information, the
advantages of easier access to the RTSS database have not
been realized. Program Managers still use the monthly
IMAPMIS reports for tracking the quality of mobilization
billet assignments.
The RTSS has, to some degree, integrated personnel
and training record data. It is an improvement over the
previous non-automated system. Integration problems,
however, still exist. This data is definitely not accessi-
ble from remote locations (Reserve Centers) , and its
accessibility from the REDCOM level is constrained by the
logistics of three nodes sharing one line to access the
central database.
It has not provided for the real time measurement
and reporting of personnel training readiness. The data are
not input to the files at the source (Reserve Center) , but
instead are mailed to the REDCOM where they are input. The
only method the Reserve Unit Commanding Officer currently
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has to determine the file contents for his unit is by
referring to a monthly hardcopy report from the REDCOM.
The use of RTSS has provided some improvement in the
area of mobilization reporting, although it is still far
short of the original goals for this area. An effective
mobilization process is the cornerstone of a viable Reserve
force and depends on a reliable communications network and
sound data. The problems associated with this area in the-
Naval Reserve are still considerable and the current RTSS
architecture does little to resolve them.
The RTSS has not reduced the administrative or
clerical workload of the operating units. It has not
provided stand-alone local processing capabilities for the
Naval Reserve Center, except for that which is provided by
microcomputers, which are not part of the RTSS.
_
The system has certainly not provided an integrated
communications capability between the local units and the
central database. This is the realm in which the RTSS
offered the greatest promise and has produced the greatest
disappointment. Processors are being distributed with
little or no thought being given to communication. Further-
more, this is just internal to the system. There are a
myriad of other problems associated with the external inter-
faces, such as the IMAPMIS discussed earlier.
Clearly, the current RTSS is not getting the job
done. It does not provide for easy information retrieval in
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desired formats. It contains duplication of data, with
inconsistencies in definition processing and data entry
which has lead to confusion and inaccurate measures of
effectiveness. The present system was developed mostly
during a period when available hardware and software were
more expensive and had less capability. It has been
developed on a piecemeal basis in response to particular
needs or crises, without full attention to possible
duplication or potential interfaces and interactions, and
often without adequate design participation from the users.
[Ref. 5:p. 3-1]
There is little question that there were some
serious problems with the planning and implementation of the
RTSS. In the words of one of the contractors who developed
the system, "It was developed heuristically, like a police
artist." This is not to say that heuristic design is
invalid, but that heuristic planning is. Actually to char-
acterize the planning of the RTSS as heuristic implies a
discernible methodology which the evidence indicates was
lacking. The manner in which RTSS has been planned and
implemented can best be presented as a lesson on how not to
design an automated information system.
2 . Reserve Financial Management/Active Duty For
Training System (RESFMS)
The Reserve Financial Management/Active Duty for
Training System (RESFMS) is the other major automated infor-
mation system being used by the Naval Reserve. Its purpose
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is to provide operational, management, and planning informa-
tion about ACDUTRA and RPN accounting to the Commander,
Naval Reserve Force.
Before the RESFMS system was developed, the Reserve
personnel. Navy (RPN) accounting system and the Active Duty
for Training (ACDUTRA) order writing system were on two
separate minicomputers. Financial accounting data generated
in the ACDUTRA system regarding commitments, obligations,
-
modifications, and cancellations were forwarded to the RPN
system via magnetic tape. Many manual procedures still
existed, especially in the financial planning and program
management areas, which resulted in information delays and
inaccuracies. The situation continued to deteriorate with
increasing ACDUTRA expenditures and the inability of the two
systems to keep up. In 1979 CNAVRES overexpended their
allotted funds, a serious error. RPN accounting was over
six months behind; they had no idea what their current RPN
balance or expenditures were. This crisis led to the formu-
lation of plans to develop a more comprehensive and respon-
sive ACDUTRA and RPN accounting system. The new system,
which began as a project in February 1981, was envisioned as
part of a larger effort to automate several aspects of the
Naval Reserve operations under one system. Approximately
two and a half years later the initial system was on-line.
This interactive system supports the ACDUTRA operational
functions and informational needs of five areas at CNRF
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including Manpower, order writing; program management for
Surface and Air readiness; the passenger transportation sec-
tion of the Personnel Support Detachment (PSD) ; RPN account-
ing; and financial management. The development has occurred
in two phases. Phase I addressed ACDUTRA order writing,
modification, and cancellation at CNRF headquarters includ-
ing processing to handle the estimation and obligation of
the funding for executing orders. This initial system was.
installed on the NARDAC UNIVAC 1100/60 in New Orleans in
March 1983. The still on-going phase 2 effort has as its
objective the extension and distribution of ACDUTRA order
writing to the field activities in the Naval Reserve.
The overall goal of the RESFMS is to provide CNRF
with a comprehensive system for the management and control
of RPN funds and to provide echelon 3 and 4 more efficient
management of the Naval Reserve ACDUTRA programs. More
effective management, in this case, is not a goal because
this system was not intended to conceptually alter the man-
ner in which ACUDTRA is being managed. Its purpose is to
speed up the process; to automate time-consuming manual
procedures. Some of the more specific objectives of RESFMS
are [Ref. 6:pp. 2-1—2-1; Ref. 7:pp. 2-2—2-4]:
a) Establish, at Echelon III, IV, and V activities, the
capability to process ACDUTRA applications, modifica-
tions, and cancellations by means of an automated
information system (AIS)
.
b) Design the completed ACDUTRA System so that it func-
tions as a subsystem of the Reserve Financial Manage-
ment System, sharing common data and providing the
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transfer of data to other subsystems, particularly the
RPN Accounting Subsystem.
c) Provide on-line access to those users whose functions
require it, allowing them to access and input source
data necessary to generate ACDUTRA orders and to
schedule system programs as needed.
d) Provide the capability to edit and validate all user
transactions storing them for problem solving, moni-
toring, or auditing needs.
e) Reduce the time inteirval between ACDUTRA. application,
return of the resulting order, and subsequent RPN
accounting transaction posting.
f) Provide the capability to track and monitor the
processing of an ACDUTRA application through final
expenditure or cancellation.
g) Provide the capability to access and report informa-
tion on an ad-hoc basis.
h) Provide the capability to properly interface between
automated IMAPMIS and EPMAC information required to
produce ACDUTRA orders.
i) Provide improvement in the productivity of data entry
through elimination of redundant data elements.
j) Provide financial management with system data suffi-
cient for use in planning and budgeting at the clai-
mant, OPTAR, responsibility and Work Center levels.
k) Provide the capability to produce hard-copy transpor-
tation documents.
The RESFMS hardware consists of a UNIVAC 1100/60
host computer (owned, operated, and maintained by NARDAC New
Orleans) , which contains the database and all data proces-
sing and storage capabilities. Users at CNRF headquarters
have access to the computer via VDT terminals with direct,
on-line access to the computer. The equipment to support
the phase 2 implementation includes the hardware in place.
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on order, or planned to support RTSS at the echelon 4 and 5
levels.
RESFMS data files are designed and organized based
on UNIVAC's Data Management System (DMS) 1100 which is a
CODASYL standard network database system. There are
approximately 1400 application programs written in COBOL
developed by NARDAC and SYSCOM (an outside contractor) . In
addition, DMS 1100 also has a Query Language Processor (QLP)
-
software package that is used to support ad hoc application
requirements on a limited basis. Limited because the
processing overhead required for running it is very high.
Finally, a non-procedural language software package, MAPPER,
is available to support additional ad hoc user needs.
RESFMS interfaces with a number of other systems and
subsystems. The five subsystems within RESFMS are: ACDUTRA
order writing, financial management, RPN accounting, travel,
and program management. The RESFMS database serves as the
sole repository for all data entered manually into the
system by the users, and for data obtained from other
systems which interface with it. This database is fed from
the following external systems:
a. NRPC provides personnel, mobilization and unit address
data from the IMAPMIS system via magnetic tape for use
in the production of ACDUTRA orders.
b. The Enlisted Personnel Management Center (EPMAC) pro-
vides unit active address status data via magnetic
tape for use in the production of ACDUTRA orders.
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c. Integrated Disbursing and Accounting (IDA) expenditure
transactions are passed from the FIPC/IDA system to
the RPN accounting subsystem via magnetic tape.
d. STOCKFUND expenditure transactions are passed to the
RPN accounting subsystem via magnetic tape.
e. Centralized Expenditure/Reimbursement Processing Sys-
tem (CERPS) expenditure transactions are passed to the
RPN Accounting subsystem via magnetic tape.
On a daily basis, RESFMS supplies ACDUTRA informa-
tion to RTSS and on magnetic tape. This eliminates redun-
dant entry of ACDUTRA data related to training for the RTSS,
but it does not eliminate the redundant entry of this infor-
mation for the IMAPMIS system.
In anticipation of the extension of the ACDUTRA
subsystem to the field activities (which is now taking
place) , CNRF conducted studies to determine the most effec-
tive means. The two possibilities were to extend the
already on-line interactive system, or to go to a distri-
buted system. The decision had to be based not only on the
ACDUTRA program, but had to also consider the issues of
costs, long-term CNRF and DoD information systems planning,
availability of existing hardware, hardware for which funds
had been programmed, and development of telecommunications
support. An economic analysis, addressing these issues, was
completed early in 1984. The result was that RESFMS will be
extended to the field as a distributed system.
In the distributed configuration, selected proces-
sing capabilities and databases are distributed to field
activities. The central database will remain on the UNIVAC
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1100/60. Database subsets will exist at designated proces-
sing centers. They are to be updated by a two-way process
of down/up-loading from the central database. This system
configuration is pictured in Figure 2-7.
In operation, ACDUTRA applications would be entered
in the system at selected field activities. Information on
the applications is validated against personnel data from
the local database. Applications are then flagged for
routing to the appropriate approval authority. At speci-
fied intervals during the day, applications are file-
transferred over telecommunications facilities to the
appropriate locations. Software for approval procedures at
these locations enable the approval authority to further
process the application and approve or disapprove it. Dis-
approved applications are then file-transferred back to the
point of entry. Approved applications are file-transferred
to program managers at CNRF headquarters. After final
approval at CNRF, the complete application is file trans-
ferred back to the point of entry where orders are printed
on local printers. In addition, the transportation subsys-
tem interface will make it possible to also have the airline
tickets printed at the point of entry.
The procedures described above represent a dramatic
improvement in efficiency over the non-automated procedures.



























An analysis of this system shows that it has
realized most of the objectives for which it was designed.
The cause of the crisis which precipitated the development
of the system, the six month lag in RPN accounting transac-
tion posting from the execution or cancellation of ACDUTRA
orders, has disappeared. The system provides virtually up
to the minute RPN accounting information. The improved
efficiency which has resulted from the automated ACDUTRA
processing procedures has made possible the elimination of
the order writing division of the Manpower department at
CNRF and has also enabled all echelons of the organization
to perform ACDUTRA processing in a much faster and more
reliable fashion.
One shortfall of the system is that it has not
really increased the effectiveness of the program manage-
ment function. This relates directly to the objective of
having the capability to access information and produce
reports on an ad hoc basis. However, this is really a minor
criticism of the implementation, not the planning or design,
of the system.
A more serious concern is with the telecommunication
costs. The design of the system called for it to use the
NARDAC network until DDN is operational throughout the Naval
Reserve. This means using leased lines to connect the
distributed processing sites to the nearest NARDAC node.
The telecommunications costs are already considerable and
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will only increase as more field activities are brought on-
line. Although the Naval Reserve is not now on the DDN,
there is some concern as to whether being part of the DDN
will solve the problem. It would be significantly cheaper,
now, for the distributed sites to tie into the closest DDN
host or TAG than it is to go to the nearest NARDAC node.
This is pictured in Figure 2-8, where the dotted lines
represent the distance to the DDN entry points and the solid
lines represent the distance to the NARDAC Network entry
points. Why isn't this being done? Because the NARDACs are
not part of the DDN. Unless this problem is resolved the
ballooning communication costs could eventually bring this
system to its knees.
There seems to be little fault to find with the
design process used in RESFMS. Again we see a development
process called "heuristic," but unlike RTSS, this one has
been fairly successful. It has been a process in which the
system has been developed step by step with constant consul-
tation and trial by users. This method was intentionally
chosen (again a contrast to RTSS) to avoid the usual pit-
falls of a system that had been designed from the top down
by analysts before users had any real chance to try out the
product. The heuristic design philosophy, in this case, is
a refreshing departure from the rigid and often inappro-

























This has necessarily been a broad-brush simplified view
of the structure and information flows of the Naval Reserve.
Its purpose was to familiarize the reader with the organiza-
tion and its functions in a general fashion. Any systems
planning methodology would need to perform a much more
sophisticated refinement of the information presented in
this chapter.
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III. STRATEGIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS PLANNING
A. INTRODUCTION
Planning is not a popular activity in many organiza-
tions. It deals with a distant and uncertain future. Any
benefit comes later, as does the satisfaction it would
provide. There is no perceived immediate advantage to
planning. In fact, the immediate effects seem to be only
negative. Planning takes valuable manpower away from the
day to day business. Often it is felt to be of more
importance to solve the immediate crisis than to give con-
sideration to more distant effects. This is particularly
true in the military, where immediate crises abound, and
where no one is in any job long enough to realize (take
personal credit for) the benefits of strategic planning.
Planning 's reputation has been further tarnished by the fact
that it has often been carried out as a meaningless mandated
ritual, doomed to a forgotten existence on some dusty
bookshelf.
A heavy price has been paid, in many instances, for
failure to plan adequately. A considerable fraction of the
less successful information systems undoubtedly suffer from
poor planning and implementation. Better strategic informa-
tion systems planning can help assure that resources will be
applied in the future in a near optimal manner and that
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systems development fiascos of the kind that have plagued
many organizations in the past will be avoided. At its
best, planning can make it possible to select systems
projects that offer the greatest future benefits to managers
and other users; projects that extend the role of informa-
tion systems into critical areas from strategic to opera-
tional management.
What, exactly, is strategic information systems plan-
ning? The answer often depends on who you ask. In some
instances, application project plans have been labelled as
"strategic" plans. In others, planning goals have been so
broadly stated that they bear little relevance to the prac-
tical problems of systems management. Clearly, a reasonable
definition lies somewhere between these two extremes. The
available literature does not reveal a clear consensus as to
the nature and scope of this kind of planning activity.
Strategic information systems planning is concerned with
formalized and disciplined approaches to identifying
requirements beyond the immediate future. The environmental
pressures making this type of planning necessary are the
increasing complexity of information systems which require
an increasingly large share of the organization's resources
and are typified by long lead time development processes.
Organizations can no longer afford not to plan.
Planning is the process of formulating a program of
action which systematically outlines the steps and
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procedures required to achieve a goal (long term) or
objective (shorter term) . Strategic planning has to do with
the overall conduct of large scale operations. It reflects
the concern of top management with the future direction and
needs of the organization.
The remainder of this chapter will explore the following
issues:
1) How to determine the proper quantity and quality of
strategic information systems planning required by an
organization; and, using those guidelines, determine
what is appropriate for the Naval Reserve.
2) Evaluate IBM's Business Systems Planning (BSP) in
relation to other planning methodologies.
3) Determine how strategic information systems (IS) plan-
ning is currently being performed in the Naval Reserve
organization.
B. INFORMATION SYSTEMS PLANNING—HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?
Strategic planning, by itself, does not necessarily
include information systems planning. By the same token,
information systems planning does not, of necessity, have to
be closely tied to corporate strategic planning. How
closely coupled the two should be is dependent on the role
of MIS within the organization. If the function is one of
only peripheral support, such as payroll processing, then it
may be inappropriate, or at least unnecessary, for IS plan-
ning to be concerned with corporate strategic planning. On
the other hand—and this is becoming more the norm as infor-
mation systems become integrated into more business areas
—
if the organization has a critical dependence on their
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information systems, then the two planning processes n^ed to
be closely related. For some organizations, IS activities
represent an area of great strategic importance, while for
others they play a cost-effective and useful role but one
which is distinctly supportive in nature. There is not a
discrete difference between these two organizational
environments. They should more accurately be viewed as two
ends of a continuum. The key is to determine the location-
of any specific organization along that continuum; to ascer-
tain the criticalness of IS activities in relation to the
company achieving corporate goals.
The idea of strategic impact of IS is just one of
several contingencies that should be considered in the
development of a comprehensive planning process. Such a
planning process, to be effective, must also deal with the
realities of the organizational culture, planning culture,
and stage of IS development. The idea of strategic impact
is the only one which will be explicitly dealt with in this
section. The other considerations will be examined in
Section D of this chapter.
In the case of the Naval Reserve this issue should be
addressed on at least two separate levels. One level stems
from the fact that the Naval Reserve is not an autonomous,
independent organization, but an integral part of a larger
Navy. Therefore, it makes sense for it to have some role in
the information systems planning process for the entire
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Navy. It will surely be a recipient of the plan regardless
of whether it participates in the planning process. By the
same reasoning, an awareness of the Navy's overall strategic
information systems plan is a necessary input to the Naval
Reserve's information systems planning process.
The second level of IS planning is that which takes
place within and for the Naval Reserve. This planning is
based primarily on the internal- requirements of the organi-
zation without being overly concerned with outside factors.
The analysis of this section, as well as the larger issue of
BSP suitability, will be in the context of this planning
environment. The Navy has its strategic information systems
planning process, of which the Naval Reserve is one part;
and the Naval Reserve has its own internal planning process
which is in turn affected by the larger total Navy process.
The current role of IS within the Naval Reserve is one
mainly of support, but a kind of support that is becoming
increasingly more mission critical. RTSS and RESFMS,
although important, were probably not originally to be con-
sidered mission critical systems. The evolution of these
systems, however, is toward a more integrated and pervasive
role within the organization. RESFMS impacts on many more
functional areas than does RTSS. This trend argues for IS
planning to become more closely tied to the strategic plan-
ning activities of top management. This would help insure
that future IS development effectively expands into the
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crucial functional areas of the organization. Where, in the
past, the IS planning process did not need to be closely-
tied to the overall corporate planning process, the growing
dependence on these systems requires that the two processes
become more in tune. The complex task of effectively manag-
ing the Naval Reserve is fast reaching the point where it
will be critically dependent on automated information
systems. There is little doubt but that current levels of
ACDUTRA and Weekend Away Training (WET) could not be
supported without RESFMS. A successful mobilization of the
Naval Reserve could not happen without a system with the
ability to quickly retrieve, update, and communicate large
amounts of accurate data.
The successful management of the Naval Reserve hinges on
an effective IS planning system. The evaluation of any IS
planning methodology must consider how well it interacts
with the top-level strategic planning process. Gone are the
days when IS planning could afford to be an isolated myopic
process. Strategic information systems planning in the
Naval Reserve calls for a well-articulated, coherent, and
effective methodology. The cost, complexity, and growing
criticalness of these systems demands it.
C. THE BUSINESS SYSTEMS PLANNING (BSP) METHODOLOGY
Information systems planning is a process that uses a
descriptive model to reflect the detailed methods of the
organization's mission. The planning methodology builds
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this model by decomposing the data, processes, and
data/people relationships. The' degree of effectiveness of
the system (s) that are subsequently developed from this
model will depend on how well the model represents the
reality of the organization. The underlying assumptions of
different planning methodologies will affect the usefulness
of the resulting models. The tools with which the model is
built are as important as the .pieces of the model. They,
will, in essence, determine what those pieces will be. It
is imperative that an appropriate methodology is used
because that methodology will determine what is analyzed and
how it is analyzed.
The methodology is an important element of the planning
process, but it is still only one part. The intrinsic
environmental factors of the organization that were dis-
cussed in the previous section also need to be considered in
developing that planning process.
This section will not attempt to answer the question of
whether BSP is the right methodology for the Naval Reserve.
The intent here is to point out how it differs from other
methodologies and examine its strengths and weaknesses in
that context only. This section will provide an important
part of the conceptual foundation that will make it possible
to answer that larger question in a rational manner.
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In the broadest sense planning methodologies can be said
to focus on technology, data, or information. A technology-
based methodology is concerned with the management of
applications and processing. It views the technology as the
corporate resource around which the planning should be
based. The Stages of Growth (SOG) model is of this type.
The data-based, or datalogical, models see the organization
in the context of data objects which are processed at
various organizational levels to form information objects at
other organizational levels. Data Flow Diagrams (DFD)
,
Structured Analysis and Design Technique (SADT) , and
Systematic Activity Modeling Method (SAMM) are in the data-
logical category. The third category is the information-
based, or infological, models. Their focus is on the
information structure of an organization. They generally
take a more macro perspective of the organization than the
datalogical models. They try to determine what is
information to what level in the organization, who owns the
information, and who needs the information. BSP, as well as
Business Information Analysis and Integration Technique
(BIAIT) and Critical Success Factors (CSF) , is representa-
tive of this category.
The datalogical models provide a detailed view of each
process or task, which facilitates the IS design. On the
other hand, this microscopic view often forces the
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forfeiture of top management involvement. The big picture
is hidden by the mass of detail.
The infological models concentrate on the macro view to
the extent that the exact details of how a system will
accomplish the processes and tasks are not explicitly
defined. This promotes top management involvement while
making the IS design problem more difficult (than the data-
logical approach)...
All the models will not be examined here. Those that
are will be so only to the degree necessary for background
in describing BSP. The purpose of this thesis is not to
find the best IS planning methodology but to evaluate the
suitability of BSP.
Stages of Growth (SOG) [Ref. 8] was the first of the
planning methodologies to be widely used. It was in vogue
at a time when the first large scale systems development
projects were being undertaken. It is still in use today,
although not as an explicit planning model. It derived from
the social sciences a notion that organizations must assimi-
late this kind of change through a predictable sequence of
steps at a modest pace. It is based on the theory that the
sequence, with stages of initiation and expansion followed
by consolidation and maturity, would be similar for all
organizations. The focus of SOG is on the management of
technology. This planning approach has been seriously dated
by technological change which has forced a change in the
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planning perspective, with the emphasis shifting from
applications and processing management to data and informa-
tion resource management [Ref. 9], This is not to say that
SOG is not a valid descriptive model, only that it is not
complete enough to be a basis for comprehensive IS planning.
It realistically stresses the need for an organization to
know where it stands today before trying to plan where it
can go tomorrow.
The planning response to the new environment caused by
technological change is well represented by IBM's Business
Systems Planning (BSP) package. "BSP focuses less on
developing organizational structures and disciplines
necessary to manage the computer room than on conceptualiz-
ing and designing the overall corporate data resource."
[Ref. 9:p. 4] As an evolution of systems planning it
changes the goal from one of following universally described
actions to one of developing highly customized goals.
Architectural recommendations are derived from the construc-
tion of an empirical model of the business enterprise.
BSP seeks to provide such a plan by emphasizing a top-
down approach to analysis that builds an infological model.
The key to the success of the top-down approach is in
getting people involved, starting with top management and
working down. The analysis stresses the perspective of top
management by working from the broad to the detail level.
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Through this analysis BSP attempts to translate business
objectives to information requirements.
BSP provides a structured methodology that, if properly
followed, would show the organization the logical way they
deal with data classes (information) and groupings (of data
classes) that would reflect major activities of information
handling. The study determines information flow within an
organization. It displays the • information/subsystem rela-
tionships and the processes supported by each subsystem.
These results can then furnish a basis for informed informa-
tion resource decisions. This is where computer support and
development priorities can be made. These implementation
priorities are determined as part of a comprehensive plan
evolving from current systems. Broadly stated, BSP stresses
top-down design and bottom-up implementation.
An important basic assumption of the BSP methodology is
that an organization should view data as a resource that is
as important as personnel, cash, facilities, or materials.
It assumes that in order for management to have a wider
perspective of the organization and to be in a position to
make effective multifunctional decisions, information should
be available not just to individual functions or departments
but throughout the business. The assumption is, in short,
that the organization has a need for a company-wide
information system.
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The BSP methodology presumes this conceptual perspective
as a starting point. Some of the organizational elements
that it sees as impediments to the successful development of
company-wide information systems are: that executive
commitment and involvement have been absent from the
planning process; that IS objectives and strategies are not
consistent with the organization's overall business
(mission) objectives; that the company-wide systems have not-
been developed as part of a comprehensive plan evolving from
current systems; and that information resource management
functions have not been put in place to adequately manage
the resources. The Naval Reserve has exhibited, to varying
degrees, all of those tendencies. The BSP methodology was
developed to abate those organizational factors. The output
of this methodology should be a dynamic viable IS plan.
An information system plan should allow a modular approach
to implementation, providing confidence that each module
will fit and function properly to form an integrated
system and will interface properly with the present
operational systems. The plan should also allow for
better decisions concerning the efficient and effective
commitment of information system development resources.
With such a plan, the required information can be more
readily obtained. [Ref. 10:p. 1]
One of the criticisms of BSP is common to all infologi-
cal models, and that is that it does not readily provide a
language for the system analyst to perform detailed system
design. BSP does, however, seem to provide a better link to
this type of activity than do most other infological models.
This shortcoming should be considered in light of the
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objectives of strategic planning which concern the develop-
ment of information systems in long-range general terms.
What BSP can provide is a comprehensive methodology for
understanding the processes of an organization in terms of
information needs.
The next chapter will consider the exact steps of the
methodology in much more specific detail in the context of
the Naval Reserve. The purpose of this section has been to
introduce the conceptual basis and objectives of BSP.
D. NAVAL RESERVE INFORMATION SYSTEMS PLANNING
In concert with the attributes of IS planning put forth
in Section B, two planning perspectives will be considered
here. One will be the Naval Reserve's role in Navy IS
planning; the other will be that planning which takes place
within and for the Naval Reserve. This section will also
explore the influence of organizational and planning culture
on IS planning within the Naval Reserve. The focus of this
discussion will be on long-range strategic planning activi-
ties rather than on specific system design.
In May 1983 the National Academy of Sciences reviewed
the Navy's ADP management processes and made recommendations
for improvements. One of the recommendations was that the
Navy develop a high-level information architecture which
depicts the flow of functional information needed to conduct
the Navy's business. OP-94 is responsible for developing
the high-level information architecture; and the Director,
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Total Force Information Systems Management Division (OP-16)
is responsible for developing the information architecture
for manpower, personnel, and training (MPT) functions. OP-
16 divided the MPT world into functional subareas. In order
to compile the information needed, OP-16 has tasked the
organizations with primary responsibility for the selected
functions to develop subarchitectures. Commander, Naval
Reserve Force is one of these organizations and is-
responsible to OP-16 in this planning process.
OP-16 has been working on a methodology that uses a tri-
level hierarchy of architectures. The methodology, still
not fully articulated, seeks to develop first an "Informa-
tion Flow Architecture" than a "Data Architecture" and
finally a "Technical Architecture."
The information flow architecture is a logical model of
the business processes of an organization. It is meant to
be the highest logical level of abstraction that documents
the functional activities and classes of information
required to meet the mission and goals of the organization.
Information flow architectures are designed to show the
organizational units (subsystems) that participate in the
business processes. Development of an information flow
architecture is a planning process that identifies the
information an organization requires to plan, control, and
execute its mission. The intent of this process is not just
to document the current information flow but to identify
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associated problem areas and develop recommended "target"
information flows to correct them.
The second phase, data architecture development, is an
extension and refinement of the information flow architec-
ture and is designed to produce a set of logical models that
will provide the basis for information systems planning.
These logical models should reflect: the functions of the
business and the data needed to- accomplish those functions;
the structure, characteristics, and interrelationships of
the data; and the availability of the data required to
support the organization.
The development of a technical architecture is the third
phase of this planning process. This architecture is a
model of the technical resources that are designed to the
information flow and data architectures. The model should
depict the relationships among AISs, communications net-
works, data bases, or computers used to process information.
As the final step in this planning methodology developed by
OP-16, the development of a technical architecture is a
design process that conveys to the user how technology has
or will be applied to provide the information required by
the business processes.
This methodology is not inconsistent with the objectives
of BSP. It is, however, not as rigorous or formalized as
the BSP methodology. It leaves much of the interpretation
of the methodology to the user. This inherent ambiguity
59
should make it relatively more difficult to use. It will be
used, however, because it has been mandated by OP-16.
This planning methodology is being used by the ADP plan-
ning department of CNRF. Its usefulness, however, is
suspect for it appears that the product is being prepared
for external consumption only. There does not seem to be
much interest within the Naval Reserve organization in this
planning process, particularly outside of the ADP planning
-
department. CNRF is participating in this planning process
only to the extent that they have been ordered to do so.
This seems to be the scope of the Naval Reserve's role in
total Navy IS planning. In fact, a good case could be made
that this is the extent of formal IS strategic planning
being accomplished by the Naval Reserve.
Any strategic IS planning that is taking place within
and for the Naval Reserve is being done not as part of some
formal process but through the default method of planning
through neglect. Internal strategic planning does not seem
to be taking place. The type of planning that is being done
is neither formalized nor consistent and is generally of a
short time horizon (less than 5 years—typically much less)
.
At its best it is tactical planning working toward specific
isolated objectives without any enunciation of overall
business goals. This is the type of planning of which
RESFMS is a result. At its worst it is strictly political;
the consequence of someone selling their latest idea to the
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Admiral. Internal IS planning is typified by different
factions planning diverse projects with no thought being
given to compatibility or long-range interoperability.
This type of planning can best be explained as part of
the organizational culture and, to a lesser degree, the
planning culture. The Naval Reserve's organizational
culture is, in many respects, a microcosm of the larger Navy
culture. In this respect it is a hierarchical bureaucracy
with a well-established chain of command. It can also be
characterized as a highly centralized organization.
Although it is geographically dispersed it is functionally
"centralized. The organizational culture of the Naval
Reserve is probably more politicized than that of the Navy
in general. That is, much of the organizational behavior
can be explained by the internal politics of the
organization.
The planning culture of the Naval Reserve has two faces:
one is the formal, as exemplified by the Planning, Program-
ming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) ; the other is the
informal, ad-hoc, and often reactionary planning that is
part of the day-to-day operation. The PPBS process has
minimal impact on strategic IS planning primarily because it
is budget focused. It is oriented toward individual line
items. The core of this type of planning, in the IS
environment, is on specific projects vice the management of
the overall data resource. The informal planning culture
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has a much more direct influence on IS planning because it
is within the context of that culture that most IS planning
is taking place. This is crisis-driven planning, person-
ality-driven planning, planning that takes place as a
byproduct of bureaucratic inertia. It is the desire to see
immediate results, the kind that can be reflected on fitness
reports. It is primarily due to the influence of this
planning culture that little or.no strategic IS planning is.
taking place. In fact, one would be hard-pressed to find
reasonable examples of any type of strategic planning taking
place within the Naval Reserve.
E . SUMMARY
It has been the intent of this chapter to explore some
of the conceptual and practical aspects of strategic IS
planning. The BSP methodology was introduced in that
context. An important distinction was made between a
planning methodology and the planning process. The planning
methodology is just one part, albeit an important one, of
the planning process. An assessment of IS planning in the
Naval Reserve showed that planning is taking place without
the benefit of any formal methodology. The type of planning
that is taking place within the Naval Reserve is largely
ineffective because the organizational factors working
against strategic planning are more influential than those
favoring it.
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IV. THE BSP STUDY
A. INTRODUCTION
The Business Systems Planning (BSP) methodology, as
developed by IBM, is a structured methodology based on the
premise that ". . . there exists within the organization a
need for significantly improved computer-based information,
systems (IS) and a need for an overall strategy to attain
them." [Ref. 10 :p. 5] As was pointed out in the last
chapter, because information systems are fast becoming a
critical component of the Naval Reserve and because they
will continue to represent major investments of time and
money, it is essential that they support the organization's
true business needs and directly influence its objectives.
BSP offers a process that can translate business strategy
into IS strategy. If the organization does not have an
apparent business strategy, as seems to be the case of the
Naval Reserve, then BSP can help it express its long-term
goals and objectives. Senior management recognition of the
importance of articulating long-term goals and objectives
will help guarantee a meaningful BSP study.
Two of the problems manifest in the Naval Reserve which
BSP is designed to correct are data inconsistencies and non-
integrated systems design. These are problems • that are
usually a result of the "bottom-up" evolution of systems.
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The data inconsistency problem for the Naval Reserve is not
exhibited as much between their internal systems as they are
as a result of external systems interfaces. This is a
"bottom-up" evolution of systems in the context of the
entire Navy, with each organization developing their own
systems. The question is whether BSP can adequately address
this situation. This is not to say that there are not
internal reasons for these problems, only that some of the-
cause is external to the organization.
The BSP methodology stresses an analysis that works from
the top down and an implementation strategy where the infor-
mation support is implemented in a modular building-block
fashion over time. This allows the implementation of
systems' to remain consistent with the organization's
business priorities, available funds, and other shorter-term
considerations
.
The first step of the BSP analysis is to define the
business objectives. This requires top-level management
involvement. The next step is to define the business proc-
esses and then to define the business data. This data
definition is accomplished by identifying what things
(entities) are important to the business and what data are
required to manage those entities. The final step is to
define the information architecture which becomes a
statement of the long-term IS objective. From the
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information architecture the individual modules can be
identified, scheduled, and built.
There are two major steps (activities) that precede a
BSP study and eleven in the study itself. The first two
are: gaining the commitment; and preparing for the study.
The eleven major activities of the study are: starting the
study; defining business processes; defining business data;
defining information architecture; analyzing current systems,
support; interviewing executives; defining findings and
conclusions; determining architecture priorities; reviewing
information resource management; developing recommendations;
and reporting results. The remainder of this chapter will
examine these steps in detail in the context of the Naval
Reserve. This will not be, by any means, a complete study,
only a general examination of processes and data sufficient
for evaluating the methodology. The level of detail
required for a full BSP study is well beyond the scope of
this thesis.
B. PRE-STUDY ACTIVITIES
The success of a BSP study depends heavily on the
commitment of all the participants. An assessment of the
commitment of all concerned (particularly at the executive
level) should be made before the study is started. Some of
the other activities to be performed during this phase
include: establishing the study scope; setting the objec-
tives; and selecting the study team.
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The scope of the study does not have to include the
whole organization. It can focus on just one department or
functional area. In the case of the Naval Reserve, for
instance, it could be limited to echelon 3 or to the train-
ing function. For purposes of this evaluation the entire
Naval Reserve organization will be examined. A full BSP
study, if undertaken for the Naval Reserve, would probably
be most beneficial if its scope included the entire
-
organization.
Businesses whose activities span multiple functional units
tend to gain more from a BSP study than those that are
more simply structured since BSP deals well with com-
plexity. It is designed to identify the requirements for
data integration across multiple functions. [Ref. 10 :p.
14]
One of the most important commitments is the commitment
of manpower and resources to the study team. A full BSP
study will require 4 to 7 people full time for 8 to 12
weeks. These team members should not be the 6 most junior
officers who just reported aboard, nor should they come from
the ADP department. They need to be from upper and middle
management with several years experience in the Naval
Reserve. If the pressures of day-to-day operations make it
impossible to devote this amount of manpower to the study
there is still a way to get it done. This other option is
to use Selected Reservists (SELRES) . There is more than
enough talent available. This approach has been used
successfully before. [Ref. 5]
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Once the commitment of all participants has been gained
and the decision made to continue with the study it is
necessary to complete the remaining actions that lead up to
the actual start of the study. During this phase interview-
ees are selected and scheduled, a study work plan is
developed, business and IS information is gathered, and
administrative support is established. At this time a
start-up meeting should be convened and full-time activities
will commence. This start-up activity and the next 5 major
activities are all aimed at understanding the business
requirements and data processing support as they exist today
as well as the business requirements for the future.
C. DEFINING BUSINESS PROCESSES
The basic step for gaining an understanding of how the
business accomplishes its overall mission and objectives and
for defining key data requirements is to define business
processes. Business processes are defined as groups of
logically related decisions and activities required to
manage the resources of the organization.
The method for determining the processes is to first
identify the product/service and supporting resources of the
organization. The product and supporting resources life
cycle is then described. For purposes of this discussion
the individual reservist will be looked at as the product of
the organization. The life cycle stages of that reservist
are: to recruit, to train, to mobilize, to retire. The
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supporting resources are the recruiting, personnel manage-
ment and training programs, facilities, and pay. There are
many business processes that could be identified for each of
these resources in each life cycle phase. After this first
rough identification, the processes are then grouped or
split as necessary to reduce inconsistencies and commonali-
ties. The team should then write a description of each
process.
The final major activity of this step is to relate the
business processes to the organization. This is done
through the development of a process/organization matrix.
It illustrates the degree of involvement of the various
organizational units in each of the processes. The four
possible degrees of involvement are: major responsibility
and decision maker (X) , major involvement (X) , some involve-
ment (/) , and no involvement (blank) . A simple
process/organization matrix for the Naval Reserve is shown
in Figure 4-1.
D. DEFINING BUSINESS DATA
Once the business processes have been identified, the
next step is to identify and define business entities, data
classes, and their relationships.
A business entity is something of lasting interest to an
organization. It can be a person, place, thing, or idea
about which data are collected and stored. They are what




































a basis for identifying the data needs of the organization.
Each entity should be able to be uniquely identified. Some
of the business entities of significance to the Naval
Reserve are: the reservist, billet, reinforcing (reserve)
unit, augmented (active) unit, readiness, appropriations,
expenditures, orders, end strength, equipment, facilities,
and schools. Each entity should be carefully defined in
detailed and complete sentences..
The second part of this process is to specify what data
must be available and what data are created by each business
process. Each type of data identified is then matched to
the entity it describes. This forces a clarification of
business entities.
The knowledge of the relationship of data to processes
leads directly to the identification of data classes. A
data class represents a category of information about an
entity. To ensure the integrity of data, there must be no
more than one source for the creation of each data class.
The final step in this activity is to define each data class
completely.
E. DEFINING INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE
After the data classes have been identified, it is
necessary to establish the relationship between data classes
and business processes. The tool used to establish these
relationships is the information architecture (process/data
class matrix). The relation can be one of three types. The
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first type is creation (C)
, where the process creates the
data class. The second relation can be usage (U) , where the
process uses the data class. The third type of relation is
no involvement (blank) . Once all the relations are labeled,
the process/data class matrix is rearranged so that
groupings of Cs and Us begin at the upper left and move to
the lower right.
What is the benefit of all. this relationship labeling
and column juggling? The groupings that are obtained from
this process can be related to organizational personnel and
structure. That is, data classes (and therefore data ele-
ments) are grouped into proper parts of the organization. A
BSP study can show the organization the logical way they
deal with data classes (information) , and groupings that
would reflect major activities of information handling.
The next step is to identify the flow of data between
process groups. Whenever there is data used by a process
and that data is created by a process in some other group,
an arrow is drawn from the creating group to the using
group. When all Us are examined and the necessary data
flows represented, the result will be a flow diagram.
Figure 4-2 is an elementary process/data class matrix
that has been transformed into a flow diagram for the Naval
Reserve. The process column starts with strategic activi-
ties followed by a mix of management and operational control



























information flows because it does not contain the level of
detail necessary to precisely reflect the processes and data
classes of the Naval Reseirve. A full BSP study would
further decompose and refine the processes and data classes
shown here. The significance of Figures 4-1 and 4-2 is not
in the information they contain but only as an illustration
of how the matrices would be used in analyzing the Naval
Reserve.
A question raised at the beginning of this chapter was
whether BSP could adequately consider data derived from
sources external to the organization. This situation can be
represented by creating a separate process for each instance
where external data are required. These processes would
then become the creation points for the internal representa-
tion of those data. This type of transformation activity is
represented by the "comply with" and "input" processes in
Figures 4-1 and 4-2.
The information architecture thus developed is an impor-
tant product of the BSP study. It yields information flow
within an organization, displaying relationships to subsys-
tems and the processes supported by each subsystem.
The completed architecture drawing is a very useful
management communication tool because:
* It is the team's recommendation for long-range informa-
tion systems implementations.
* It identifies the information systems (the blocks or
boxes) that form the long-range plan.
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* It shows the data controlled by each information system
(reading vertically)
.
* It shows the business processes supported by each
information system (reading horizontally)
.
* It shows the flow of information between the various
information systems (the lines and arrows) and thus
shows the flow of information through the business
itself. [Ref. 10:p. 45]
From these results, information resource decisions can be
made. That is, decisions concerning subsystems to receive
computer support and development priorities of the computer
subsystems can be made.
None of these decisions, however, can be made using the
simple graphic which is Figure 4-2. About all that can be
discerned from that figure is that it seems to indicate that
all aspects of the management of the reservist are closely
related. It helps explain the interfaces and duplication of
data that exist between RTSS and RESFMS. Even this simple
graphic argues for the integration of those two systems.
F. THE FINAL STEPS
The activities up to this point have been to look at the
organization in terms of business processes and the data
classes necessary to perform them. The next step in the BSP
process is to analyze current systems support. It uses the
process and data class information developed by the previous
steps. Much of this analysis was presented in a different
format in Chapter II. The importance of this examination is
to ensure that computer system development decisions are
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based not only on the information architecture derived from
the business information but also on current computer
systems.
After the team has examined all the business and IS
information, it is necessary to get executive input. The
requirement for this input is dictated by the top-down
approach of BSP. The executive perspective is gained by
conducting interviews with personnel from the top levels of
management. These interviews serve to validate the
processes, data classes, organization, and their interrela-
tionships. They help to clarify the future direction of the
business and its impact on information requirements. They
also should identify and document the business problems so
that they may be related to business processes and data
classes.
At this stage the fact gathering is complete. Now it is
time to arrange the facts, analyze them and draw conclu-
sions. Architecture priorities can then be determined.
In addition to determining information architecture and
setting application priorities, BSP also stresses a need to
ensure that the information resource is managed properly to
support the functional needs of the business. This
includes: seeing that the information architecture is
implemented in an orderly fashion; consistent attention to
the effectiveness of information systems; that the respon-
siveness of information processing is assured; and that a
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viable information resource plan exists. "The basic premise
of information resource management is the ability to make
information available to whomever needs it when and where it
is needed." [Ref. 10:p. 69]
The BSP study team evaluates the information resource
management environment and recommends any changes necessary
to keep it in consonance with these objectives. Some of
these issues were addressed in .Chapter II. In addition to.
those comments (of Chapter II) , a further recommendation of
a BSP study for the Naval Reserve may be to form a steering
committee from the functional groups of the enterprise to
oversee the information resource organization. If properly
implemented, this committee could be instrumental in
changing the perspective of the organization in regard to
the proper role of information resource management. In
focusing on the information resource management functions of
the organization, BSP tries to ensure that the study will be
more than just an isolated inconsequential occurrence; but
that it would be a cornerstone of a dynamic, responsive, and
effective information resource organization.
G . SUMMARY
This chapter explored how well the BSP methodology would
fit the Naval Reserve organization. This cursory examina-
tion showed that not only would it fit but that it would
also go a long way toward resolving some of the major prob-
lems of information resource management and planning that
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were discussed in Chapters II and III. A partial analysis
of business processes and data classes highlighted the need
for the integration of RTSS and RESFMS, the two major
information systems of the Naval Reserve. The bottom line
of this chapter is that BSP is a structured and comprehen-
sive planning methodology that would prove to be very




The Naval Reserve is a complex and geographically dis-
persed organization, the effective management of which is a
non-trivial problem. It is an organization rich in infoirma-
tion but poor in the management of that information. Effec-
tive information resource management is a pivotal,
prerequisite for the successful administration of that
organization. A task which is further complicated by the
nature and extent of external information interfaces.
Information systems in the Naval Reserve are dependent on
various data that are owned and defined by external
organizations.
Information systems are becoming increasingly critical
to the management and day-to-day operations of the Naval
Reserve. It is critical that their development be as a
result of careful and comprehensive strategic IS planning.
Many of the shortcomings of the present information systems
can be attributed to ineffective long-range planning. The
critical nature of current and future systems demands
effective IS planning. Unfortunately, the planning environ-
ment of the organization is short-term crisis oriented. The
organizational culture is contrary to any kind of strategic
thinking. This is the major problem of the Naval Reserve;
one which no planning methodology, by itself, can solve.
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Some fundamental conceptual changes need to take place
within the organization in order to facilitate, not only-
more effective information resource management, but also
more effective overall management.
In determining the suitability of BSP for strategic IS
planning, several salient issues must be considered. The
most important of these is how well it conforms to the
planning culture and other important environmental organiza-
tional factors. BSP, and all that it stands for, is an
anathema to the organizational culture of the Naval Reserve.
There would have to be a substantive change in the percep-
tion and implementation of planning activities in the
organization before a BSP study could be of any real
benefit. At this point it would probably be little more
than an academic exercise with insignificant organizational
impact. It may, however, be more palatable than a blatant
call for strategic planning because it does offer some
short-term benefits in determining architecture priorities.
A related issue is the extent to which BSP would fit
into the Navy's strategic IS planning process. Just as
hardware and software compatibility is important in com-
puter to computer communications, so too is planning
methodology compatibility important between levels of the
same organization. Although it is not strictly compatible
with the planning methodology mandated by OP-16, it is not
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incompatible. It also seems to be more useful than that
still evolving methodology.
In BSP, the validation of the study is a product of
interviews with top-level management. This presupposes that
these managers have a far-sighted and undistorted
perspective of the organization and a thorough understanding
of its functions and problems. This could prove to be a
dangerous assumption in the case of the Naval Reserve. The
question is whether these managers have a sufficient knowl-
edge of the functions and problems of the lower echelons of
the organization. A related question is whether the study
would get adequate input from these lower echelons. Since
top-level managers may not fully appreciate the needs of the
entire organization, it is imperative that the study team
thoroughly examine the entire organization. They could not
complete the study without leaving New Orleans. They would
need to travel to a variety of lower echelon commands in
order to get a true picture of the organization.
BSP could be a principal component of a viable planning
process. It is not, however, an easy solution for the
institutional neglect of strategic planning activities.
Although a BSP study could offer significant benefits, it is
still just a tool that, if used improperly or in the wrong
environment, could do little for the organization. BSP can
provide a comprehensive methodology for understanding the
processes of an organization in terms of its information
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needs. This is something that has not been done in the
Naval Reserve and is sorely needed.
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